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ABSTRACT:  Corporate  governance  is  concerned  with  the  relationships  between  a  business’s 
management and its board of directors, shareholders and lenders and its other stakeholders such as 
employees, customers, suppliers, and the community in which activates. The connection between 
this  topic and  creative accounting  was  debated in the literature  since the latter occurrence is 
related to the weakness of the first. Our study offers interesting insights into this strong connection 
by  examining  the  relevant  ideas  developed  previously  in  the  literature  with  the  scope  of 
understanding, reinterpreting and rediscovering from interesting points of view this association in 
our search for responsibility in the economic environment. By conducting this study we wanted to 
reinforce the role of literature analyst as an interpreter who contributes meaning to the present 
state of the art.  
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Both concepts are treated in the literature extensively and the difference employed regards 
the perception of each. While the first concept is treated and accepted as having a general meaning, 
the latter is considered to be controversial in terms of meanings and acceptance. 
In this regard its conceptual delimitation is considered to be necessary in the introduction of 
this study since the meanings attributed reflect also our views.  
   The concept “creative accounting” assimilates various definitions in the literature and it is 
examined under two important viewpoints: a positive one and a negative one. 
From a positive viewpoint, it may seem that creative accounting connotes invention of accounting 
principles and techniques to recognize changes in economic, social, political and also business 
environments and recognizes genuine changes in accounting practice. From a negative viewpoint, 
creative accounting means undesirable practices which assimilates  unethical elements for attracting 
providers of the capital by presenting an misleading and deceptive state of a certain firm`s affairs. 
Most of the conceptual delimitation regarding creative accounting is related to those two viewpoints 
and the general trend identified in the literature supports the negative viewpoint. 
The  practice  of  creative  accounting  has  the  power  to  distort  the  underlying  financial 
performance of a firm, making more difficult for an investor or financial analyst to assess the 
performance of the firm and to compare between different companies. For this reason  creative 
accounting  as  a  deceiving  practice  conflicts  with  the  basic  aim  of  accounting  regulation  
transforming the exercise of standard setting in a redundant feature on one hand and on the other 
                                                 
1  PhD  Student,  Babes-Bolyai  University  Cluj-Napoca,  Faculty  of  Economics  and  Business  Administration, 
beattrice.vladu@econ.ubbcluj.ro 
2  Full  Professor,  PhD,  Babes-Bolyai  University  Cluj-Napoca,  Faculty  of Economics  and Business  Administration, 




hand  providing  an  unfair  advantage  to  companies  that  are  able  to  successfully  practice  this 
deceiving exercise. 
The  opinions  regarding  creative  accounting  practice,  as  an  instrument  of  deceiving  are 
various and the definitions multiple. The scope of our study was not to reproduce this definitions 
(even if this demarche can be useful for a better understand of the latter topic) but more to construct 
an internal history of the relevant literature that approached this topic. In regarding we consider 
more relevant to approach the creation of a network of core terms for the literature in question and 
to identify the primary and secondary core terms used to describe this topic into the international 
relevant research community. In  this respect we used Papineau`s (1976) concept of descending 
order of core terms to demarche those terms that are central to all researchers with the scope of a 
thorough understanding of the development of a particular literature.  
Since  the  scope of  the  article  is  not to develop  the epistemology  of  this construct  and 
moreover the association with the corporate governance construct, we debated only four different 
opinions regarding the creative accounting meaning under the aegis of Papineau`s (1976) hierarchy 
of core terms as following: 
  As  regarding  Metcalf  (1977:188)  approaching  we  identified  as  primary  core  term  in 
explaining  creative  accounting  the  ``accounting  techniques``  that  permit  corporations  to 
report financial results that may not accurately portray of business activities. As secondary 
core terms we can further develop based on its assumptions the subjective and objective 
manner in which the accounting techniques are used; 
  From  Naser  (1993:2)  we  can  identify  as  primary  core  terms  for  explaining  creative 
accounting the ``accounting figures``. In this respect the preparers motivations are important 
since their desire is to take advantage of the existing rules in order to succeed to accomplish 
their particular goals; 
   Citron (1995) view provide other primary core term as ``accounting rules`` and further as 
secondary core terms the implicit desire of preparers to `` stretch`` the rules and ``mislead`` 
the reader of financial statements; 
  Amat and Gowthorpe (2004) opinion regarding creative accounting provide an interesting 
sight  since  it  provides  two  types  of  primary  core  terms  as  ``ambiguities``  and  `` 
discontinuities`` of the law. The secondary core terms comprise the implications of the first 
one together with the desire of mislead rather than to help the intended used. 
In our opinion creative accounting can be defined as a mean being used by the companies 
in order to adapt, develop and become more competitive in the turbulent environments in which 
they operate, adaptation  that requires  highly adaptive professionals able  to generate  creative 
ideas even if these employ interpreting grey areas to their advantage being less prudent almost all 
the time; seek for loopholes in specific rules being not as consistent as should be or develop 
devices which regulators have not thought to forbid. 
 
Theoretical framework for sustaining our research question 
In terms of linking the two concepts we consider the definition elaborated by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) as representative since we can identify the roots of creative accounting behavior as 
the following confirms the potential existence of inappropriate conduct of management: “Corporate 
governance encompasses all the provisions and mechanisms that guarantee the assets of the firm are 
managed efficiently and in the interests of the providers of finance, mitigating the inappropriate 
expropriation of resources by managers or any other party to the firm”. 
Managers sometimes mislead shareholders regarding the underlying economic performance 
of a certain company or may influence contractual outcomes that depend upon reported accounting 
figures  (Healy,  1985;  Perry  and  Williams,  1994;  DeFond  and  Jiambalvo,  1994).  By  using 
judgments  in  financial  reporting  and  through  structuring  transactions  they  may  alter  financial 




a  true  and  fair  view  of  the  economic  activities  of  a  company.  Managerial  discretion  in  the 
application  of  accounting  methods  used  to  report  firm  performance  is  not  considered  to  be 
manipulative until this particular discretion is used with the intent to manipulate reported results. 
This is related also to the fact that managers may focus on short-term personal incentives such as 
maximizing salaries, bonuses, and other short-term compensations, rather than focus on the long-
term economic success of the firm. All those doubts appear where a separation of the ownership 
from the control of a corporation exists and in this respect the conflict that arises is described by the 
Agency theory.  
In the context of Agency Theory the firm is considered to be a legal fiction that serves as a 
focus  for  complex  process  that  is  characterized  by  conflictual  features  of  the  objectives  of 
individuals  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976).  The  conflicts  are  related  to  sharing  the  economic 
resources and the lack of confidence, these conflicts between the shareholders and managers being 
considered in the literature to be the root of creative accounting. Most studied conducted in the 
literature are concentrated so far on the relationship between shareholders-management interaction 
that involves the intensively debated conflict of interests as the frameworks developed by Demski 
(1994), and further Christensen and Feltham (2005) explained. 
The  topics  corporate  governance  and  creative  accounting  practices  are  discussed  in  the 
literature in the context of internal demand for manipulative behavior which emanates from the 
contracting  value  of  earnings  management  in  the  principal–agent  relationships  between 
shareholders and managers (Dye, 1988). 
This particular conflicts of interests inherent in agency relationships, sometimes are limited 
having  the  fact  that  shareholders  overlooked  and  accept  deliberate  manipulations  of  accounts 
becoming in this way ``unwitting accessories to manipulation`` (Gowthorpe and Amat, 2005) as 
they are accepting the fact that part of manipulation of accounts advantage them. 
The importance of corporate governance studies in the area of creative accounting presented under 
all its forms of manifestation is related to the general trend presented in the literature that poor 
governance induce or sustain a manipulative behavior. Also discussions are regarded the fact that 
poor  governance  results  in  inflated  compensation  packages  that  induce  CEOs  to  act  in  a 
manipulative manner. On the other hand, recent studies conducted in the literature approached the 
problem of poor corporate governance primarily with the scope of discovering the features that 
contribute to this state and documented that the causality of this demarche is represented by the 
earnings management and further extended to accounts manipulation.  
In this respect, further empirical studies are needed to detect surely the association between 
accounts manipulation and corporate governance and assess the importance of each other and the 
way that they reinforce each other. 
The  topic  of  information  asymmetry  is  also  discussed  since  no  approaching  regarding 
corporate governance in the area of creative accounting omits it and since the theory regarding 
information asymmetry has the potential to explain the multiple incentives found on the financial 
market to manipulate accounting data and further to assess the consequence of such behavior. The 
work of Vickrey (1945); Akerlof (1970, 1976); Mirrlees (1971); Spence (1973); Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976) is examined since they developed the pioneering studies regarding asymmetry of 
information. By understanding their work we can have a thoroughly understanding of the markets 
behavior with consequences upon our area of research since information asymmetry is regarded as a 
also as a genesis point for manipulative behavior. The  general  view  when  it comes to explain 
information asymmetry is that one side of the market has better information that the other. In the 
context of corporate governance the CFO and the board of the company knows more than the 
shareholders and other users of accounting information about the profitability of the company. 
Five theories have provided the theoretical underpinning for research opportunistic behavior 
in  the  area  of  corporate  governance.  Agency  theory;  legitimacy  theory;  institutional  theory; 




managerial  opportunistic  behavior.  By  examining  those  theories  the  association  of  corporate 
governance with creative accounting behavior is interpreted and thoroughly explained. In regarding 
of these theories our goal was to explain several components that are related to our area of research 
not to thoroughly explain the theories or to assess their evolution or impact as independent theories. 
Based  on  the  relevant  theoretical  framework,  we  developed  the  research  questions  as 
following: 
  Are there significant theories that can explain the importance of treating those concepts 
under the aegis of association? 
  The empirical studies that approached those concepts under the aegis of connectivity have 
the potential to explain this association based on empirical data? 
 
Methodology 
In this regard we were interested in choosing an appropriate methodology that could enable 
us to answer the questions identified and further to achieve our aim. Since this study is not an 
empirical  study,  but  a  fundamental  research  we  adopted previously  tried  methods  used  in  the 
literature for this kind of studies and we approached the idea of constructing an internal history of 
literature in order to be able to answer to  our research question. In this respect we  efficiently 
identified  the  principal  authors  and  papers  by  ``backtracking``  them  from  the  recent  and  also 
relevant contribution to the literature. 
We identified the theme and the issues approached on the basis of a general sampling of the 
literature. As implicit methodology adopted it was the inductive methodology that sustain the main 
idea of the fact that general conclusions regarding the development of a subject are drawn from a 
sample of literature. Since this study is not an empirical one, the problems associated with the 
applying of such a method are not found in our study. 
 
Findings – Discussions based on relevant theories and discussions that emphasize the 
approached association  
There  are  two  different  patterns  through  which  companies  are  financed,  both  of  them 
affecting accounting earnings. Each one of the two patterns of financing the companies is related to 
the corporate governance model that prevails in a particular country. If a certain country belongs to 
the  Anglo-American  accounting  model  the  determinant  corporate  governance  model  is  the 
shareholder model. In this context the capital market has a great role in financing companies and as 
a  consequence  of  that  great  importance  will  be  put  in  information  presented  to  shareholders. 
Companies  in  this  context  are  dominated  by  equity  and  there  is  a  great  separation  between 
managers and owners and as a consequence of this the information asymmetry that exists in the 
complex may have the power to give rise to corporate privileged structures as management. In this 
particular  context  the  incentives  to  manipulate  accounting  information  are  considered  to  be 
stronger. 
In a country belonging to Euro-Continental accounting model, the corporate governance 
model that is reflected in this context is the stakeholder model. In this context, great emphasis is 
placed on the information presented to the creditors (e.g. banks) since the finance pattern of the 
companies  is  related  to  them.  Accounting  rules  are  conservative  as  they  serve  mainly  for  the 
creditor’s needs of information.  
In both corporate governance models, information asymmetry is seen as a genesis point for 
creative  accounting  occurrence  or  earnings  management  behavior.  In  a  context  of  information 
asymmetries, the managers can opportunistically manage the accounting number in order to present 
the results that are expected by the market. The main purpose appears as a consequence of the 
desire to avoid the negative consequences that of the news that raised the alarm would represent in 




Information asymmetry is a topic that first developed as a prolific part of economic theory 
when  for  most  than  two  decades  researchers  examined  incentives  and  market  equilibrium  in 
situations with asymmetric information. The economic theory comprised The Theory of markets 
with asymmetric information, developed by pioneering studies like those conducted by: George 
Akerlof (University of California, Berkeley, 1970, 1976), Michael Spence (Stanford University, 
1973) and Joseph Stiglitz (Columbia University, 1976). The importance of those studies relies in 
the fact that various tools for analyzing a broad spectrum of issues were developed since their 
applications extend from traditional agricultural markets to financial markets. Once extended to 
financial  markets  the  genesis  point  for  introducing  the  term  and  its  associating  features  is 
accounting become a fact.  
Akerlof  (1970)  article  The  Market  for  Lemons:  Quality  Uncertainty  and  the  Market 
Mechanism is considered to be the most important contribution to the literature on economics of 
information.  This  paper  introduces  the  universal  idea  that  information  asymmetry  governs  the 
markets and in the same time opens points to broad applications. In his 1976 article entitled The 
Economics of Caste and the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales discuss about the significance of 
informational  asymmetries  in  widely  different  contexts  and  provide  information  regarding 
undesirable equilibrium on the markets with information asymmetry. Both studies are important 
for area of research having the fact that the theory of information asymmetry is approached and 
the concept thoroughly explained. Another fundamental insight and extremely important for our 
area of research is that economic agents, according to the author, attempts to protect themselves 
from the adverse consequences of informational asymmetries may explain existing institutions 
that guarantee the good functioning of markets. This original approach has generated in the 
following  years  an  entire  literature  analyzing  how  economic  institutions  may  mitigate  the 
consequences of asymmetric information. 
Spence`s  most  important  work  (1973)  demonstrates  how  agents  in  a  market  can  use 
signaling  to  counteract  the  effects  of  adverse  selection.  In  this  context,  signaling  comprise 
observable actions taken by economic agents in order to convince the opposite party of the value or 
quality of their products. Even  if author`s article Job Market Signaling (1973) deal with  labor 
market, the theory of signaling can be extended to different markets. The essence of Signaling 
Theory can be applied in our area of research too, this being the reason why the work of Spence 
(1973) was discussed in our study.  
Stiglitz`s article with Rothschild entitled Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An 
Essay  on  the  Economics  of  Imperfect  Information  (Rothschild  and  Stiglitz,  1976)  represent  a 
complement analyses for Akerlof (1970, 1976) and Spence (1973, 1974). The research question that 
guided their work is the following: ``what can uniformed agents do to improve their outcome in a 
market  governed  by  information  asymmetry?``.  Without  any  doubt  complete  and  opportune 
information represent the  success of any affair. Since the authors developed by their work the 
paradigm  of  classification  of  equilibrium,  their  work  is  considered  extremely  important  in 
microeconomics theory and in information economics in particular, where their work is the most 
cited one. Their work was examined in the context of our research based upon the fact that they 
were the first one that asserted that economic models may be quite misleading if we disregard 
informational  asymmetries.  Every  model  developed  that  has  the  potential  to  explain  a  certain 
behavior  can  fail  to  achieve  its  goal  if  the  market  in  which  it  operates  is  characterized  by 
information asymmetry.  
The work of Vickrey (1945) and Mirrlees (1971) is also important for our area of research 
since  they  bring  fundamental  contributions  to  the  theory  of  incentives  under  asymmetric 
information.  
In the context of accounting, corporations have stakeholders who rely on the validity of 




who benefit from them or are harmed by, and whose rights are violated or respected by corporate 
actions (Donaldson and Werhane, 1999: 251).  
The  previous  definition  introduces  the  concepts  of  Agency  Theory,  the  theory  that 
dominates this field of research. Since the root of opportunistic behavior is considered to be located 
in the problems that this theory rise having the fact that this particular theory is seen as the theory of 
conflicts between managers and shareholders where the first category are prompted to manipulate 
the latter category perceptions and further influencing their decisions on financial performance and 
future economic trend of the company. It is this particularly theory that implemented in the area of 
manipulation of accounts the idea that managers are not neutral in presenting accounting financial 
statements (Sydserff anf Weetman, 1999). 
In this respect two different points of view are discussed. The first one is related to the fact 
that managers are trying to provide information to users of accounting  information  in order to 
overcome the information asymmetry that take place between their knowledge and outsiders. The 
scope of this demarche is considered to be in this context enhancing the share performance and 
increasing  managerial  compensation  (Baginski  et  al.,  2000).  The  other  view  that  is  related  to 
Agency Theory and gained more advocates is related to the fact that managers provide information 
through the channel of disclosure in order to achieve their own goals. In this context the disclosure 
strategies are regarded as opportunistic (Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Aerts, 2005). A more general 
view  was  asserted  by  Cormier,  Aerts,  Ledoux,  Magnan  (2009)  that  extended  the  literature on 
voluntary disclosure by examining the impact of precision attribute of social and human capital 
disclosure on information asymmetry. The results documented that quantitative disclosures reduces 
share  price  volatility  and  firms  appear  to  take  into  account  ultimate  costs  and  benefits  to 
shareholders when determining their disclosure. The general idea of the study was the fact that 
efficient governance leads to more disclosure. 
Legitimacy Theory has also been used in explaining corporate reporting disclosure practices 
but not like the previous one. According to this theory the main scope of disclosure is to alter 
perceptions  regarding  the  legitimacy  of  the  organization  since  disclosure  are  not  regarded  as 
voluntary channels of information but as responses to public pressure (Hooghiemstra, 2000) since 
firms are considered to have a social contract with the society they activate since their survival 
depends  of  societal  norms.  In  this  respect  sometimes  firms  may  focus  more  on  the  need  for 
information on customers’ needs rather than investor’s needs when preparing the annual reports 
(Ogden and Clarke, 2005). 
While the Legitimacy Theory asserts that firms respond to social norms, the Institutional 
Theory asserted that firms respond to institutional expectations but adopting norms and procedures 
in order to reduce inspection by internal and external constituents. In this respect managers are 
assumed to respond to institutional pressures when disclose their financial statements. A practical 
example can be found in the study conducted by Bansal and Clelland (2004). The authors found that 
managers  respond  to  environmental  pressure  disclosing  environmental  liabilities  by  which  the 
commitment to the environment can be assessed. The Stakeholder Theory is similar to Legitimacy 
Theory, the differences const in the fact that firms prepare the financial statements as a response 
and demand of various groups of stakeholders (e.g. employees, customers, government agencies, 
etc).  This  Theory  is  important  for  area  of  research  since  it  regard  firms  under  an  aegis  of 
manipulation with the scope of altering the perceptions of a particular group of stakeholder. 
Signaling Theory is focused on the behavior of managers in well performing firms who tend 
to disclose the performance with greater transparency in their presentation of financial statements. 
In this respect the study conducted by Smith and Taffler (1992) is representative. The precepts of 
this theory are important for our area of research since  it assess the managerial behavior with 
implication regarding firm performance.  
The scope of discussing those theories in our area of research it given by the fact that each 




actions.  While  Agency  Theory  and  Signaling  Theory  are  preoccupied  by  the  investor`s 
informational data regarding financial performance and the channels related to this, the other three 
theories consider that society as a whole that comprise also the stakeholders particular needs of 
information, is comprised in the audience of firms’ disclosures that in those cases offers a different 
view since in those disclosures social and environmental performances are approached proving the 
fact that manipulation is not related only to financial performance.  
 
Findings  –  Discussions  based  on  relevant  empirical  work  that  documented  the 
association of corporate governance and creative accounting 
The  pioneering  studies  in  accounting  area  that  investigated  the  relationship  between 
information asymmetry and earning management were conducted by Dye (1988) and Trueman and 
Titman (1988), who asserted that the existence of information asymmetry is the necessary condition 
for earnings management. With this study, information asymmetry is brought directly in accounting 
area  since  it  was  associated  with  manipulative  behavior.  Since  then  and  to  the  present  times, 
information asymmetry is regarded in the accounting literature just the same. 
Schipper (1989) also approached the relationship between the information asymmetry and 
earnings management and concluded that when information asymmetry is high the shareholders and 
stakeholders do not have sufficient information, resources, incentives or access in order to monitor 
manager’s actions fact that gives rise to earnings management practices. The same opinion is shared 
by Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) who tested this hypothesis in a broad sample setting as well as 
around seasoned equity offerings. The results in a broad sample setting suggested a significant, 
positive relationship between earnings management and information asymmetry. Those results are 
consistent with the fact that the greater information asymmetry is between the managers and its 
shareholders the more likely the company is engaged in earnings manipulations. 
Others results of the studies conducted around seasoned equity offerings serves as a second 
setting to  test the relationship  between  information  asymmetry  and  earnings  management.  The 
empirical study conducted Rangan (1998), indicate the fact that management faces the incentives to 
manage the earnings upward prior to seasoned equity offerings in order to maximize the offer prices 
of the shares. This is a proof that they are willing to focus on short-term objectives rather on long-
term objectives. 
Richardson  (2000)  tested  the  hypothesis  that  the  magnitude  of  information  asymmetry 
affects the magnitude of earnings management practiced by firm’s managers. The author conducted 
a direct test of Dye (1988) and Trueman and Titman (1988) theory that the presence of information 
asymmetry  is  a  necessary  condition  for  earnings  management  and  extended  the  argument  by 
introducing  the  relationship  between  them  assessed  in  terms  of  magnitude.  The  tests  of  the 
hypothesis provided evidence of the predicted positive relationship between information asymmetry 
and  earnings  management.  Positive  association  was  also  documented  between  the  quality  of 
corporate governance and earnings management in the study conducted by Ali Shah, Ali Butt, 
Hasan (2009). 
When those two topics are treated simultaneously (e.g. corporate governance and creative 
accounting), the third topic of information asymmetry between firms and other stakeholders arise. 
In this context the studies comprised in the literature also examined the way in which ``gatekeepers 
are monitors that are supposed to alleviate the information asymmetry``, like: analysts, institutional 
shareholders who are blockholders and activists, boards of directors and their audit committees, 
auditors, the press, and investment bankers, and credit agencies (Ronen and Yaari, 2008,  pp. 54). 
The  role  of  corporate  governance  complex  mechanism  is  to  minimize  information 
asymmetry and to ensure compliance with mandated reporting requirements while maintaining the 
credibility of a firm`s financial statements and safeguard against manipulative behavior (Dechow et 
al. 1996; Davidson et al., 2005). Corporate managers  in their fiduciary role as the stewards of 




of the capital and as a consequence should focus to maximize long-term earnings correlated with 
improved business strategies, objective successful operations and sustainable development.  
When corporate governance area intersects with creative accounting presented under all its 
forms of manifestation, information asymmetry is not the only problem involved. The fact that 
managers tend to focus on short-term personal incentives (e.g. enhance market value of the stock 
for  stockholders  or  to  increase  income-based  compensation  for  management  like  bonuses  or 
maximizing salaries)  rather than  focus  on  long-term economic success  of the  firm  could  harm 
seriously the future of the firm. This particular vision is usually accompanied with aggressive use of 
manipulating  techniques  which  causes  the  topic  of  creative  accounting  to  rise  to  a  level  of 
importance in the area of corporate governance and not only.   
Dechow et al., (1996) issued a part of the previous opinion based on their empirical study 
that documented a strong association  between earnings management occurrence and the lack of 
features  of  a strong  corporate  governance,  features  as: the absence of  an audit  committee;  the 
combination of the CEO and founder roles; the combination of the CEO and the chair of the board 
roles;  board  of  directors  dominated  by  insiders;  and  absence  of  an  external  blockholder  (i.e. 
watchdog) monitoring management. 
Further  studies sustain  their  opinion. The empirical  study  conducted by  Davidson  et al. 
(2005) concluded that boards and audit committees dominated with non-executive members are 
significantly associated with lower possibility of earnings management. Another empirical study 
demonstrated that voluntarily established audit committee has an important role in limitation of the 
manipulative behaviors (Jaggi and Leung, 2007). 
Until now we have seen how corporate can influence accounting items but this approach is 
not  complete.  The  other  part  of  the  approach  is  that  cosmetic  accounting  and  accounting 
irregularities also had the power to influence corporate governance underlying principles.  
Following accounting  scandals at  the  prominent  companies  discussed  above, there  have 
been important changes in corporate governance since most of the scandals were discussed and their 
magnitude assessed in the context of a weak corporate governance mechanism. Since corporate 
governance previous features were accused of comprising features that further induced and maintain 
a climate of opportunistic behavior, many changes were proposed and there has been a sweeping 
overhaul of regulations on corporate governance. From all the changes employed in the context of 
corporate  governance  we  consider  the  following  as  having  the  most  immediate  effect  in  limit 
manipulative behavior. Since the most prominent accounting scandals were in USA, the change of 
corporate governance mechanisms came also from this accounting environment. As we approach 
above, two events changed the corporate governance mechanism and from this point the corporate 
mechanisms all over the world changed. First regulation event took place in July 2002, when the 
USA adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which applies to all public companies with stock traded in 
the  United  States.  Among  its  many  provisions,  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  required  a  substantial 
change of vision when required that a company`s board to have a majority of independent directors 
and that the board's audit committee consist entirely of independent directors, further to have at 
least one member with financial expertise and to restrict the types of non-audit services that the 
outside  auditor  can  provide  (all  these  changes  were  adopted  based  on  accounting  scandals 
experience). 
The second event took place in the end of 2003 when the biggest capital markets in the 
world (e.g. NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) adopted new sets of corporate governance rules that 
apply to most of their listed companies. Their rules were based on Sarbanes-Oxley Act and were 
designed to avoid serious accounting problems in the future.  
In 2005 an empirical study was conducted by Agrawal and Chadha with the main goal of 
examining id corporate governance mechanisms are related to the possibility of a company restating 
its earnings. After examining a sample of 159 U.S. public companies that restated earnings the 




that several key governance characteristics are essentially unrelated to the probability of a company 
restating earnings. These include the independence of boards and audit committees and the extent to 
which outside  auditors provide non-audit  services  to  a firm.  This empirical study  is  important 
having the fact that it demonstrates the fact that the prominent changes to corporate governance 
mechanisms have achieved its goals. 
In the light of accounting scandals such as Enron and subsequent regulatory reforms like 
those introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, various studies had been conducted in the area 
of accounting and auditing , examining the role of corporate governance and various features of this 
complex mechanism. Most of the studies are focused of Agency Theory (Cohen et al., 2002), and 
examined how the monitoring roles of the board and the audit committee have been used to protect 
or fail to protect stockholder rights. What most of those studies have in common is the fact that they 
ignore the effect management may have on the governance process and sustain that independent 
boards must monitor management actions. Since those studies are based on Agency Theory the fact 
that they  let out of discussion the role of management  is  not hard to predict since the role of 
management  in  corporate  governance  is  somewhat  inconsistent  since  the  theory  suggests  that 
governance parties must monitor and thus be independent of management. 
In response of accounting irregularities the frameworks for corporate governance in USA 
and elsewhere was re-examined. Among the key standards for international financial architecture 
that were modified were also the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (that covers certain 
aspects of accounting and auditing in relation to corporate governance) considered to be essential 
to  the  soundness  and  stability  of  financial  systems  and  as  having  a  key  role  in  measures  to 
strengthen international financial architecture. 
Five  basic  subjects  are  covered  by  the  OECD  Principles  of  Corporate  Governance  as 
following: 
  protection of the rights of shareholders; 
  equitable treatment of all shareholders comprising full disclosure of material information 
and also the prohibition of abusive self-dealing and insider trading; 
  equitable  treatment  of  all  stakeholders as established  by  law  and  encouragement of co-
operation between company and stakeholders; 
  timely and accurate disclosure and transparency with respect to matters material to company 
performance, ownership and governance; 
  strategic guidance of the company and effective monitoring of its management by the board 
of  directors  as  well  as  the  board’s  accountability  to  the  company  and  its  shareholders 
ensured by the corporate governance framework. 
If we assess the Enron scandal having as a bases those principles we can conclude that most 
of them weren`t respected. The lack of transparency was the main item that contributed to the 
breakdown of corporate governance in regarding of this particular company. Key items of Enron`s 
lack  of  transparency  were  represented  by the manipulation  of  both its earnings  figures  and its 
balance sheet; manipulation that  involved extensive use of creative accounting techniques like: 
special purpose entities, hedges and mark-to-market accounting. . 
 
Findings  –  Discussions  based  on  corporate  governance  features  that  sustain  the 
connection of the concept with creative accounting documented in empirical works 
The empirical studies that associated corporate governance with creative accounting were 
interested in assessing the role of the first in the occurrence of creative accounting and to assess 
empirically its magnitude. Studies like those conducted by Rajgopal et al., (1999); Beekes et al. 
(2002); Agarwal and Chadha (2005) are representative in this respect.  
In  any  of  those  studies,  various  components  of  corporate  governance  mechanism  are 
discussed in association with creative accounting features. The study conducted by Rajgopal et al. 




conducted by Agarwal and Chadha (2005) tested for association between accounting restatements 
and the board of directors  and the audit committee concluding based on their regression that there 
is a positive association. Beekes et al. (2002) examined the relationship between board of directors 
and accounting quality concluding that the first category has the power to influence the latter. 
In  the  following  figure  we  summarized  various  corporate  governance  factors  that  were 
examined in association with creative accounting in the literature. 
  
 
Figure No. 1 – Association between various corporate governance factor and creative 
accounting according to the literature 
 
Jensen (1986) asserted that managers occasionally strive to defeat takeover activities by 
making their firm presume more debt. In this respect the author explains that takeovers can be for 
managers an unwanted demarche having the fact that this employs new ownership and established 
new management. The managers cab fight against this by increasing the level of debts and reduce 
the  probability of taking  place  new  offers  for the existing  shareholders.  Other  aspect  that  was 
examined was the debt contact constrains (Duke and Hunt, 1990) in association with opportunistic 
behavior.  
Large stock shareholders are considered the most important group in the company and two 
features defines them: they are the most informed investors and they are interested in long-term 
performance of the company. Managers for improving their remuneration packages are interested in 
performing creative activities that in long term can affect the part of the rewards designated to those 
particular investors. In this context, the first category will is not interested in earnings management 
activities and will have more motivation to accomplish monitoring activities (Schipper, 1989). 
Auditor independence  is seen  in the  literature as a possible root for creative accounting 




concluded  that  high  non-audit  fees  paid  to  auditors  are  more  likely  to  be  related  to  creative 
accounting compared to high audit fees, as non-audit tasks produces higher profits than audit tasks. 
Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) also documented a positive association between non-audit fees 
and earnings surprises and magnitude of discretionary accruals. 
Becker et al. (1998) documented that small audit firms showed high discretionary accruals 
in the accounts compared to large auditing firms and concluded that the latter category is more 
effective in limit opportunistic behaviors that the first one. The study of the Becker et al., (1998) 
was conducted based on the believe that large audit firms with good brand name select their clients 
very good and will always chose the clients that are not engaging in creative accounting techniques 
(DeAngelo, 1981).  
The independence of the board of directors is associated with protecting the interests of 
shareholders and election of top management (Jensen, 1993). According to Fama and Jensen (1983) 
the  company’s directors should  keep  a status  by  employing  skill  personnel  who can  take best 
decisions  as  well  as  execute  those  decisions  promptly.  In  this  context,  creative  accounting  is 
considered to be negative associated with this particular feature of corporate governance. Lai and 
Tam (2007) conducted an empirical study in order to examine the impact of independent board of 
directors over the propensity of smoothing earnings and the conclusions revealed that Chinese firms 
that  voluntary  adopted  independent  directors  as  well  as  firms  that  have  larger  fraction  of 
independent directors have less severe practice of income smoothing. 
Auditor  industry  expertise  was  assessed  in  association  with  earnings  management  by 
Krishnan  (2003)  who documented  that  specialized  auditors  (measured in  terms of both  auditor 
market share in an industry and an industry share in the auditor`s portfolio of client industries) 
mitigate accruals-based management more than non-specialist auditors influencing positively the 
quality of earnings.  
The independent board can be a factor that has the power to restrict creative accounting until 
this is not related to the incentives offered to independent directors. In this respect, stock options 
schemes  are  calculated  based  on  firm  profitability.  If  this  decreases  managers  may  engage  in 
manipulative  schemes and  the  independent  directors  may tolerate  this  kind of behavior  by  not 
disclosing it (Imhoff, 2003). According to Bartov and Mahanram (2004), many top management 
directors have the incentive to time their stock option in such a way that it is exercised and then 
information  is  disclosed.  The  empirical  study  conducted  by  Meek,  Rao  and  Skousen  (2007) 
documented  a  positive  relationship  between  CEO  stock  option  compensation  and  discretionary 
accruals this implying that earnings management is more likely where stock options are a larger part 
of CEO compensation 
When  it  comes to management remuneration, this  is strongly connected to the financial 
performance of the company and as a consequence of this fact; the more profitable a company is the 
highest rewards managers will receive. In this respect, Healy (1985) sees this association as having 
the power to generate earnings management schemes. This vision is similar to Guidry et al. (1999) 
vision, as the latter documented that for receiving maximum bonus, managers make use of accrual 
decisions that boost the profitability. 
Internal audit was also examined in association with the level of earnings management. The 
study conducted by Prawitt, Smith and Wood (2009) assessed the influence of internal auditors on 
earnings management occurrence measured by two separate proxies like: abnormal accruals and the 
propensity to meet or beat analysts forecast. The results of the empirical study documented that 
internal audit quality (measured based on their role in  financial reporting) is associated with a 
moderation in the level of earnings management measured by the above proxies.  
Most of those factors are considered corporate governance tools designed to restrict creative 
accounting but still some of them inspire it (e.g. management remuneration). Having the various 
misdeeds in accounting the importance of corporate governance instruments increased over time. 





Most of the corporate problems were associated in the literature with the separation of the 
ownership from the control of a corporation based in the Agency Theory precepts. In the modern 
frameworks of organization of the economic entities the agency relationship as described by the 
Agency Theory exists between owners and managers. The connection of corporate governance with 
creative accounting takes place in this context where managers will always try to maximize their 
own interest instead of the owner’s interest.  
The Agency Theory is only one of the theories that approached those concepts under the 
aegis of connectivity and based on its existence we can assert that our first research hypothesis was 
validated and the theoretical framework involved is the prove that this connection is treated not only 
at empirical level but also in fundamental one. 
The  spectacular  increases  in  unexpected  business  failures  and  the  ease  of  unscrupulous 
directors  in  expropriating  other  stakeholders,  the  limited  role  of  auditors,  the  executive 
compensation  based  on  company  performance  have  brought  concerns  regarding  corporate 
governance mechanisms efficiency (in this respect Stiles and Taylor (1993) study is representative 
since  it  approached  the  corporate  governance  weaknesses  discussing  them  in  the  context  of 
Maxwell scandal).  
Most of the studies examined are debating those particular views while others focus more on 
the role of information asymmetry seen also as a root for creative accounting in this context. The 
lack of transparency in corporate governance mechanism and other weaknesses of this complex 
mechanism opened various doors for creative accounting. In the empirical studies approached the 
connection between these two concepts is evident and more than that the relationship is documented 
by empirical data, validating in this respect our second research hypothesis. 
In the recent years, many of the mechanisms of corporate governance were improved by 
accounting; auditing and corporate governance regulations with the scope of gradually overcome 
those problems connected to opportunistic behavior. We used the term ``limit`` intentionally and 
not eradicate since we consider that this battle of corporate governance mechanisms with creative 
accounting as being a two-edged sword: some corporate governance features like independent board 
of directors will try to limit  its occurrence while other governance properties like management 
remuneration packages will inspire it.  
This  study  reflects  in  many  ways  our  opinions  regarding  the  connection  of  those  two 
concepts that only in recent years have been considered important to approach from this point of 
view directly while aiming to be a warning sign regarding the responsibility of looking in all facets 
of the problems facing the contemporary economic environment. 
 
Limitations of the present study and scope for future research 
Since this study aim was to be an interpreter of the literature, the sampling of the literature is 
crucial. Since we used only the sources that were written in English language this could result in a 
important limitation of the study. 
As further research involved we intend to assess empirically the association of corporate 
governance features and creative accounting in the Romanian economic environment since no study 
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